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1 Introduction
In setting price controls, regulators are likely to have a number of duties
and objectives. Typically, at the centre of these requirements for the postal
sector is likely to be a duty or objective to ensure the continuing provision
of universal postal service implying ubiquity of provision and geographical
uniformity of tariffs for at least single piece mail items. Continuing provision
implies also setting a price control which ensures the financial viability of
an (efficient) universal service provider (USP). The optimal structure for a
price control reflecting an objective of maximisation of allocative efficiency is
that of a global price cap (GPC), (Billette et al, 2003). But regulators may
have other objectives which may be linked to their statutory duties. These
may include the promotion of competitive entry into the postal market and a
desire to keep the prices of at least single piece mail low for equity and social
reasons. For example, Panzar (2004) has suggested very convincingly that
regulators may wish to minimize the (highly visible and politically sensitive)
single-piece price while allowing the USP to break even. In seeking to achieve
a balance between these objectives, regulators may make trade-offs and adopt
rules that are non-optimal compared with the benchmark of the GPC.
In this paper, we examine some of these issues by comparing the results
of the second best (Ramsey) welfare-maximising program to those obtained
with alternative procedures that might be adopted by regulators in seeking to
achieve also other objectives. The focus of our paper is therefore on the struc-
ture of price controls in the postal sector and the implications and impacts
of regulators seeking to satisfy a range of objectives or duties including al-
locative efficiency, equity and the promotion of entry while seeking to ensure
continuing provision of universal service. We do not try to model explicitly
the regulator’s objectives other than welfare-maximisation and to derive from
them the optimal price control mechanisms that should be imposed on the
USP. One reason why we do not follow this normative approach is that we do
not know how regulators weigh the different objectives that they may pur-
sue simultaneously. The approach this paper takes is more positive, starting
from price control mechanisms that are used in practice, and studying the
consequences of different policies and procedures in terms of price structure,
volume and welfare levels and other issues such as the continuing financial
viability of the USP. Doing this requires not only to study these procedures
analytically, but also to resort to numerical simulations of a calibrated model.
In our model, the USP offers two end-to-end (E2E) products: a single
piece product and a business mail product. An entrant, acting as a com-
petitive fringe, offers a bulk mail product that is an (imperfect) substitute
to the bulk mail offered by the USP. This setting builds on De Donder et
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al. (2006a), but is richer in three dimensions. First, we assume two delivery
areas (urban and rural) instead of one, and impose that the USP single-piece
letter price be the same in both delivery areas (while bulk mail prices may
be differentiated across areas). Second and more importantly, we assume
that the USP sells access to its (rural and/or urban) delivery areas to the
entrant. In other terms, the USP sells an intermediate good as well as two
E2E products. The entrant chooses whether to deliver itself on a given area
or whether to access the USP’s delivery area. Third, the presence of access
products as well as E2E products allows us to study a wider variety of price
control procedures than in De Donder et al. (2006a).
The paper proceeds as follows. Our model is set out further in section 2.
Section 3 studies analytically the two price control procedures we concentrate
on: a global price cap/Ramsey program with a minimum difference between
bulk mail and access prices, and a price cap procedure with two baskets of
mail products. Section 4 calibrates the model while section 5 presents the
numerical results obtained with these price control mechanisms, depending
on whether access is available or not, and looks at their robustness. Section
6 studies the introduction of a universal service fund financed by taxing the
entrant’s output. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There are two postal operators: the USP and an entrant. The USP offers
two products (single-piece mail and bulk mail) to two delivery areas (urban
and rural). The USP is required to post a single price, denoted by q, for
single-piece mail without distinction of the delivery area. We denote the
demand function for single-piece mail delivered to area i = U,R by xi(q).
The entrant offers a bulk mail product for urban and rural delivery. Both
bulk mail products (the one offered by the USP and by the entrant) are
imperfect substitutes in any given area. The demand in one area does not
depend on the price charged for delivery to the other area. The demand
function for USP bulk mail delivered in area i = U,R is denoted by yIi (p
I
i , p
E
i )
with pIi the USP price and p
E
i the entrant’s price, and with ∂yIi (.)/∂pIi < 0 and
∂yIi (.)/∂pEi > 0. Similarly, the demand for the entrant’s bulk mail product is
given by yEi (p
I
i , p
E
i ) with ∂yEi (.)/∂pEi < 0 and ∂yEi (.)/∂pIi > 0.
The demand functions come from the maximization of net consumer sur-
plus, with gross consumer surplus given by Vi(xi) for single-piece mail sent to
area i and Ui(yIi , y
E
i ) for bulk mail sent to area i. As is standard in this liter-
ature, we use surplus as a measure of welfare for firms buying mail products
(see Billette et al. (2003) for instance).
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The postal activity is divided in two segments: the upstream segment
is composed of collection, sorting and transportation, while the downstream
segment is delivery. Each segment has a constant marginal cost. Upstream
marginal costs for the USP are cx for the single-piece good and cI for the
bulk mail product, with cx > cI . Downstream marginal costs for the USP
are dxi for delivery of single-piece mail and dIi for delivery of bulk mail to
area i = U,R. We assume that dxi = dIi and that d
I
R > d
I
U . Similarly for the
entrant, we have that rural delivery of bulk mail, dER is more expensive than
urban delivery, dEU .
Beyond selling the two E2E products, the USP also sells the entrant
access to its delivery network in both areas for a unit price of ai, i = U,R,
which we call the access charge. We assume that the selling of access to both
areas is mandatory and has to be offered by the USP. The entrant can choose
whether to deliver by itself or to access the USP delivery network on each
area. The entrant will choose the cheapest way –i.e., to access the USP
delivery network in area i = U,R if dEi > ai and to bypass otherwise.
The universal service obligations translate into a fixed cost F for the USP.
The entrant behaves like a competitive fringe. The price of the entrant is
then
pEi = c
E +min(ai, d
E
i ), i = U,R.
3 Price control procedures
As noted in the introduction, in practice regulators have several duties and
objectives to fulfil when setting price controls in addition to ensuring the pro-
vision of the universal service, such as promoting competition and entry to
the sector and equity. The associated policy procedures may include multiple
baskets rather than a global control; accompanying cost allocation rules to
divide fixed costs between products inside and outside of the price control;
and constraints on individual product prices and the relationship between
prices. In this section, we examine analytically the effect of two such proce-
dures, namely, setting a minimum price difference between bulk mail prices
and access prices which can be used as a way to promote and maintain entry
into the market; and multiple baskets which when linked to a cost allocation
rule such as EPMU can be viewed as another way to constrain prices and
may act to support equity objectives and/or promote entry. We first develop
our analysis without allowing for the possibility of bypass before showing the
analytical impact of its availability in section 3.3.
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3.1 Global price cap with constraint on margin be-
tween E2E and access price
In this subsection, we study the procedure where a minimum difference be-
tween bulk mail and access prices is added to the classical Ramsey problem.
Our objective is to analyze the impact of this constraint on the optimal
prices. We show in an appendix that these prices can be decentralized us-
ing a suitable global price cap – i.e., a price cap that includes the access
products sold by the regulated operator.
The Ramsey, second best optimal prices maximize total welfare (net con-
sumer surplus plus postal firms’ profits) subject to the USP breaking even.
They are the solution to
max
q,pIU ,p
I
R,aU ,aR
W =
X
i=U,R
Vi(xi) +
X
i=U,R
Ui(y
I
i , y
E
i ) (1)
−(xU + xR)q − pIUyIU − pIRyIR − pEUyEU − pERyER
+(1 + λ)[(q − cx − dxU)xU + (q − cx − dxR)xR
+(pIU − cI − dIU)yIU + (pIR − cI − dIR)yIR
+(aU − dIU)yEU + (aR − dIR)yER − F ]
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the USP profit constraint and
where the arguments of the demand functions have been omitted.
To this optimisation program, we add a constraint on the minimum differ-
ence between the access charge and the USP bulk mail price on both delivery
areas:
pIi − ai ≥ mi, i = U,R (2)
with this minimum difference mi chosen by the regulator. We associate the
Lagrange multipliers ηi, i = U,R to these constraints.
We obtain the following first order conditions, for q, pIi and ai (i = U,R)
respectively:
−(xU + xR) + (1 + λ)[xU + xR + (q − cx − dxU)
∂xU
∂q
+ (q − c− dxR)
∂xR
∂q
] = 0,
(3)
−yIi + (1 + λ)[yIi + (pIi − cI − dIi )
∂yIi
∂pIi
+ (ai − dIi )
∂yEi
∂pIi
] + ηi = 0, (4)
−yEi + (1 + λ)[yEi + (pIi − cI − dIi )
∂yIi
∂pEi
+ (ai − dIi )
∂yEi
∂pEi
]− ηi = 0. (5)
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To interpret these conditions, we first assume that the margin constraints
(2) are not binding at the optimum (i.e., ηi = 0). If the budget constraint
is not binding either (i.e., λ = 0), we obtain marginal cost pricing for bulk
mail as well as for access. The single-piece price is then given by a convex
combination of the marginal costs in both delivery areas.
Unfortunately, given the fixed cost, the USP does not break even with
marginal cost pricing so that λ has to be strictly positive at the optimum.
Still assuming that ηi = 0 and solving separately for ai, we obtain
ai = d
I
i + (p
I
i − cI − dIi )
− ∂y
I
i
∂pEi
∂yEi
∂pEi
+
λ
1 + λ
yEi
∂yEi
∂pEi
, (6)
where the optimal access charge is the sum of the delivery cost, a foregone
profit term factored by the displacement ratio1 and a Ramsey term. If we go
further and solve simultaneously for ai and pIi , we obtain
a∗i = d
I
i +
λ
1 + λ
yEi
∂yIi
∂pIi
− yIi
∂yIi
∂pEi
∂yEi
∂pIi
∂yIi
∂pEi
+
∂yEi
∂pEi
∂yIi
∂pIi
, (7)
pI∗i = c
I + dIi +
λ
1 + λ
yIi
∂yEi
∂pEi
− yEi
∂yEi
∂pIi
∂yEi
∂pIi
∂yIi
∂pEi
+
∂yEi
∂pEi
∂yIi
∂pIi
, (8)
where both prices are expressed as the sum of marginal cost and of a Ramsey
term.
We now assume that the margin constraint is binding in area i. In that
case, it will prove easier to replace pIi by ai + mi in the modified Ramsey
problem rather than using the Lagrange multiplier method. While the first
order condition for q is unchanged, the condition for the optimal access charge
becomes
−(yIi + yEi ) + (1 + λ)[yIi + yEi + (ai +mi − cI − dIi )(
∂yIi
∂pIi
+
∂yIi
∂pEi
)
+(ai − dIi )(
∂yEi
∂pIi
+
∂yEi
∂pEi
)] = 0, (9)
because increasing the access charge also increases the bulk mail price when
the constraint (2) is binding.
1See Armstrong (2002) and De Donder (2006).
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We start as previously by assuming that λ = 0, in which case (9) simplifies
to
ai = d
I
i + (c
I −mi)
∂yIi
∂pIi
+
∂yIi
∂pEi
∂yIi
∂pIi
+
∂yIi
∂pEi
+
∂yEi
∂pIi
+
∂yEi
∂pEi
. (10)
Recall that the Ramsey prices when λ = 0 and in the absence of margin
constraint are equal to marginal cost, i.e. ai = dIi and p
I
i = c
I + dIi so that
pIi −ai = cI . Since we assume that the margin constraint is binding, we have
that cI < mi –i.e., the first part of the second term in (10) is negative. As
for the second part of the second term, it is positive in the usual case where
direct price effects on demands are larger (in absolute value) than cross price
effects – i.e., ∂yIi /∂pIi + ∂yIi /∂pEi < 0 and ∂yEi /∂pIi + ∂yEi /∂pEi < 0. We
then obtain that ai < dIi– i.e., that access charges are smaller than delivery
cost when the margin constraint is binding. The intuition for this result is
straightforward: in the absence of margin constraint and of (binding) profit
constraint, the optimal access charge equals the USP delivery cost. The
margin constraint is binding if and only if the minimum margin mi is larger
than the USP collection cost cI . In that case, the optimal access charge
decreases (compared to the situation without binding margin constraint)
and becomes smaller than the USP delivery cost, while the optimal bulk
mail price increases.
Unfortunately, the presence of fixed costs prevents the USP from breaking
even with these prices. The value of the Lagrange multiplier of the profit
constraint is then positive at equilibrium. We obtain that
ai = d
I
i + (c
I −mi)
∂yIi
∂pIi
+
∂yIi
∂pEi
∂yIi
∂pIi
+
∂yIi
∂pEi
+
∂yEi
∂pIi
+
∂yEi
∂pEi
+ λ
−(yIi + yEi )
∂yIi
∂pIi
+
∂yIi
∂pEi
+
∂yEi
∂pIi
+
∂yEi
∂pEi
, (11)
where the third term plays the role of a Ramsey term, calling for a mark-up
that is inversely proportional to the sensitivity of the bulk mail demands to
prices. Given the addition of this term, the comparison with the optimal ai
under the classical Ramsey problem is in general ambiguous. We will then
have to resort to numerical simulations to sign this comparison.
3.2 Two separate price cap constraints
We now consider that the regulator imposes more than one price cap con-
straint. More precisely, the regulator decides on the number of separate price
cap constraints, and on which goods they cover. We treat here the “two bas-
ket” case – i.e., the case where the regulator imposes separate price cap
6
constraints on non-competitive and on competitive products. We assume
that the access products belong to the competitive basket (since they are
closer substitutes to the bulk mail products than to the single-piece mail),
but it is easy to modify the analysis presented here to other cases.
We assume that the regulator sets the proportion of fixed costs to be
recovered inside each basket.2 We denote by α the proportion of fixed costs
that has to be recovered by the non-competitive basket. The problem for the
USP is then two fold. First, for the non-competitive basket, the USP looks
for the (smallest) value of q such that
(q − cx − dxU)xU + (q − cx − dxR)xR = αF.
Second, for the competitive basket, the USP solves
max
pIU ,p
I
R,aU ,aR
(pIU − cI − dIU)yIU + (pIR − cI − dIR)yIR (12)
+(aU − dIU)yEU + (aR − dIR)yER
−μ
£
nIUp
I
U + n
I
Rp
I
R + naUaU + naRaR − p¯
¤
where μ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the price cap constraint in the
competitive basket.
We assume in what follows that, once the regulator has —totally arbi-
trarily from the viewpoint of this analysis— chosen the value of α, it sets
the weights and average price in the competitive basket at their optimal,
welfare-maximizing levels given this constraint. In other words, the com-
petitive basket price cap is chosen by the regulator in order to decentralize
the optimal, third-best Ramsey prices for the competitive goods – i.e., the
prices that maximize total welfare subject to the constraints that the USP
globally breaks even and that the proportion of the fixed costs covered by
the single-piece mail is α. This means that, although α does not appear in
(12), the value of α is used by the regulator when choosing the values of nIi ,
nai and p¯.
The choice by the regulator of the proportion α is arbitrary. Let us de-
note by α∗ the proportion of the fixed cost recovered by the single-piece
product under the optimal global price cap (see appendix, equation (14))
or equivalently in the classical Ramsey program (1). It is clear that, if the
regulator imposes two separate price caps but chooses α = α∗, we end up
with the optimal second best situation. If α is set below α∗, this will drive
the single-piece mail price down and the other prices up, compared to their
optimal second-best levels. Formally, the formulas for the equilibrium com-
petitive prices are still given by equations (7) and (8), but the value of λ is
2This is also the approach adopted in De Donder et al. (2006b).
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now larger than in the global Ramsey problem: by imposing that a higher-
than-optimal share of the fixed costs be covered by competitive products, the
regulator increases the tightness of the budget constraint for this group of
products, which in turn increases the Lagrange multiplier of this constraint.
We obtain the opposite result if α is set above α∗. Finally, if α is set at too
extreme a level (too low or too high), it may become impossible for the USP
to satisfy the constraint in that no set of prices can be found that will allow
the USP to breakeven. Such matters will have to be solved using numerical
simulations.
3.3 Introducing bypass
We now open up the possibility for the entrant to bypass the USP delivery
network. Bypass will occur in area i if ai > dEi . We assume (as will be the
case in the numerical simulations) that bypass occurs in the urban area only,
i.e., that aU > dEU , aR < d
E
R. We further assume that the USP is not allowed
by the regulator to undercut the entrant’s delivery cost in order to prevent
bypass from occurring. On the other hand, the USP perfectly anticipates that
bypass will occur if the optimal urban access charge it chooses in the previous
two sub-sections is larger than the entrant’s delivery cost. In that case, the
USP has to integrate in its optimisation that urban bypass will prevail –
i.e., first order conditions in the previous two sections have to be modified
to take into account that no profit will be made by the USP on the selling
of urban access. This is straightforward (and indeed simplifies the analysis
compared to the section above). First note that the analytical formulations
for the optimal single-piece mail price, rural bulk mail price and rural access
charge are not affected by the availability of urban bypass (although the
equilibrium values of these prices are affected because of changes in the value
of the Lagrange multipliers at equilibrium). So for instance, the optimality
conditions for q, pIR and aR are still given by (3), (4) and (5) above in the
case of a global price cap accompanied by a minimum margin requirement.
As for the urban bulk mail price, equation (4) then simplifies to
λyIi + (1 + λ)(p
I
i − cI − dIi )
∂yIi
∂pIi
= 0 (13)
which gives the classical Ramsey price formulation.
We now go beyond the exploitation of first order conditions, in order to
compare price, volume and welfare levels attained under the various price
control procedures. Resorting to numerical simulations is especially impor-
tant to assess the impact of allowing for (urban) bypass, since first order
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conditions are not well suited in the context of a binary decision like bypass.
We then turn to the calibration of this model.
4 Calibration
Our calibration assumptions are based on De Donder et al. (2006a), modified
to take into account the fact that we have modelled two delivery areas here.
We start from the hypothetical situation where the USP does not face any
entrants. We assume that the USP posts a price of 0.50 euro for the single
piece product, and of 0.40 euro for its bulk mail product. Total quantities
sold at those prices are, respectively, 2 billion and 8 billion items. We assume
that 80% of all mail flows are urban while 20% are rural, and that the direct
price elasticities are -0.2 for single-piece mail and -0.4 for bulk mail (same
elasticity in urban and rural markets). Finally, we calibrate linear demands
based on these quantities, prices and elasticities.
We need further information to calibrate the demand functions for bulk
mail products when the market is opened to competition. We use two types
of information: the extent of entry for different price configurations and the
substitutability between the two bulk mail products for consumers. As for
the extent of entry, we assume that entrants would capture 10% of the total
market for bulk mail if both bulk mail products had the same price, and 50%
of the market if entrants were to offer a 20% price discount over the USP. As
for substitution between those products, we assume that the displacement
ratio −(∂yIi /∂pEi )/(∂yEi /∂pEi ) is set at 0.75 in both areas, which means that
three quarters of the quantities sold by entrants are effectively displaced from
the USP, while one quarter represents additional volumes sold in the sector.
Table 1: Cost calibration
USP Entrant
urban rural urban rural
Single-piece upstream cx = 0.18
delivery dxU = 0.11 dxR = 0.16
Bulk-mail upstream cI = 0.12 cE = 0.15
delivery dIU = 0.11 d
I
R = 0.16 d
E
U = 0.15 d
E
R = 0.36
Fixed cost F = 1680 0
The USP unit upstream cost is equal to 0.18 euro for single-piece mail
and 0.12 euro for bulk mail. The USP urban delivery cost (for both kinds of
mail) is 0.11 euro in the urban area and 0.16 euro in the rural area. The value
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of the fixed cost F equals 1 680 million euros so that the USP breaks even
in the hypothetical monopoly situation (including a normal rate of profit, F
equals 40% of revenue of 4.2 bn).
The entrant’s collection cost cE is set at 0.15 euro, its delivery cost at
0.15 euro in the urban area and 0.36 euro in the rural area. The entrant
does not face any fixed cost, and we assume that it results in higher variable
collection and delivery costs than the USP.
5 Results
5.1 Monopoly
Table 2 contains the results of the simulations carried out with the model
calibrated in the previous section. It reports prices (in euros), quantities (in
billion items), contributions to the USP profit and net consumer surpluses
(both in billions of euros) for various scenarios. The first scenario studied,
which we will use as a benchmark, corresponds to the second-best optimal
prices in the monopoly situation. It is reported under the heading GPC (for
global price cap) in Table 2. Observe that these optimal prices differ from the
prices we have used to calibrate the model: the single-piece price q is higher
(0.609 euro instead of 0.5 euro) while the bulk mail prices are differentiated
according to the delivery area. The reader can check that the contributions
to the USP profit add up to 1.680 billion euros, which is the value of the USP
fixed cost. The selling of single-piece letters allows to cover 35.1% of this fixed
cost, the rest being financed by the bulk mail products. The total welfare
attained in this setting is 6.510 billion euros, and is constituted exclusively
of consumer surpluses.
5.2 Competitive entry through access only
We now turn to the opening of the market to competition. The next three
columns in Table 2 assume that bypass is unavailable to the entrant. We first
look at the second-best optimal prices under competition and compare them
with the optimal prices under monopoly. We obtain given our calibration
that the E2E USP prices are barely affected by the opening to competition
and decrease very slightly. The single-piece volumes, contributions to the
covering of the fixed costs and the consumer surplus they generate are then
also unaffected. The USP bulk volumes decrease in both delivery areas, but
this is more than compensated by the volumes sold by the entrant. The
contribution to the USP profit of the bulk mail products decreases to the
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benefit of the business of selling access, whose contribution represents 6.3%
of the fixed costs. Consumers benefit from the availability of the entrant’s
bulk mail products and the economies of scale from higher volumes being
delivered through the UPS’s network, so that total welfare increases to 6.526
billion euros.
The next column in Table 2 considers the case where a constraint is
imposed on the minimum price difference (or “margin”) between the bulk
mail price and the access charge in any given area. Observe that, for the
second-best optimal prices, this margin is equal to 0.149 euro in the urban
market and 0.255 euro in the rural market. In the column headed “Min
Margin”, we impose that the margin should be equal to at least 0.17 euro3,
so that this constraint binds at the optimum for the urban but not for the
rural market. Comparing with the optimal prices without this constraint,
we obtain that the USP decreases its urban access charge and increases its
urban bulk mail price to satisfy the margin constraint. Other prices are also
affected: the single-piece price and the rural access charge decrease while
the rural bulk mail price increases. The entrant’s prices decrease since both
access charges decrease. As for the volumes, the number of single-piece
letters increases, which in turn increases the net consumer surplus. The
entrant’s bulk mail volumes increase at the expense of the USP’s but overall
volumes are higher than both the GPC cases so that the constraint on the
margin induces both additional entry and higher market volumes. The share
of fixed cost covered by the selling of single-piece mail decreases to 32%,
while the share covered by the selling of access increases to 10.4%. The loss
of consumer surplus in the bulk mail market is larger than the gain in surplus
in the single-piece market, so that total welfare decreases compared to GPC
to 6.515 billion euros.
We now turn to the price control mechanism where the regulator imposes
two separate price caps on the USP, with one cap on the single-piece mail
and another cap on a second basket, composed of bulk mail and of access
products. This case is identified by the heading “2 basket” in Table 2. We
assume that the regulator imposes the same cap on the single-piece mail as
the price used in the hypothetical monopoly situation used to calibrate the
model, i.e., that q = 0.5 euro. This means that the profit made by selling
single-piece letters covers 23.8% of the USP fixed cost. This proportion is
lower than the one obtained in the optimal (one-basket) global price cap,
so using the notation introduced in section 3.2., we have that α < α∗. We
then assume that the second price cap is set optimally by the regulator,
conditional on the constraint that this basket should fund the remaining
3An arbitrary but reasonable amount.
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76.2% of the fixed cost. Compared with the second-best optimal prices in
the GPC column, all prices in the second basket (bulk mail and access) are
higher, volumes are lower including those for the market overall and consumer
surpluses from bulk mail are lower. The total welfare level attained decreases
compared to the second-best level, and is close to the level obtained under
the “Min Margin” scenario.
Observe that the gap between the single-piece price and the rural USP
bulk mail price is very low in the this scenario (0.047 euro). This means that,
if the preparation cost incurred by bulmail senders is larger than 0.047 euro,
non residential senders would pay less to use single-piece mail than bulk mail
in the rural area. Obviously, if this constraint is binding at the optimum, it
will lead to lower welfare levels than those reported in Table 2.
5.3 Competitive entry through access and bypass
We now look at the impact of allowing for bypass on the equilibrium prices,
volumes and welfare. Observe that the optimal access charge with a GPC is
larger than the entrant’s delivery cost on the urban area (0.21 euro compared
to 0.15 euro) while it is lower in the rural area (0.269 euro compared to
0.36 euro). This would result in urban bypass by the entrant, a situation we
model in the last column of Table 2. More precisely, we study the second-best
optimal prices when the USP does not provide access to its urban delivery
network. Comparing with the situation without urban bypass, we obtain that
the USP reacts to the loss of urban access volumes by increasing its single-
piece price by more than 0.24 euro. As a consequence, the share of fixed costs
covered by the single piece product increases from 35.1% to 56.5%. Both the
rural access charge and the price paid for the USP’s rural bulk mail also
increase with bypass. The bulk mail products offered by the two competitors
are strategic complements, so the urban USP bulk mail price decreases when
the entrant’s bulk mail price decreases thanks to bypass. As for welfare,
consumer surplus decreases for all products except the urban bulk mail. Total
welfare decreases with bypass and is even lower than the welfare level attained
in the monopoly situation under this calibration although volumes are higher
than in the other cases so that the decline in welfare is relatively modest.
This result confirms the similar results we have obtained in De Donder et al.
(2006a) and De Donder (2006).
By extension, from these papers and from the results for no bypass, the
additional constraints in the “min margin” and “2 basket” cases would reduce
total welfare further in the case of bypass compared with the no bypass and
monopoly cases (see De Donder et al. (2006b)).
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5.4 Robustness
We test the robustness of our results to two assumptions: the degree of differ-
entiation between bulk mail products offered by both competitors (measured
by the displacement ratio) and the entrant’s efficiency.
In the case of a higher differentiation, where the displacement ratio is
lowered from 0.75 to 0.6 and reported in Table 3, consumer welfare rises
in all scenarii. This is rather intuitive, since more differentiation means
enlarging the set of goods available to consumers. We also obtain that the
ranking of the different cases is not affected by this change: the highest
level of welfare is attained under competition with a global price cap and
no bypass possibility. Adding constraints to this global price cap, such as a
minimummargin between prices or separating goods in two baskets decreases
the welfare level, which nevertheless remains larger than the highest welfare
level attainable in the monopoly situation. On the other hand, allowing for
bypass under the GPC case results in urban bypass and in a total welfare
level lower than the monopoly situation. The price of single piece mail again
rises very substantially in this case. Finally, modifying the degree of product
differentiation affects which (if any) minimum margin constraint is binding,
and also the size of the welfare cost of adding such a constraint, or of splitting
the mail products in two baskets.
As a second sensitivity, we assume that the entrant is more efficient than
the USP both for collection (0.09 euro cost compared to 0.12 euro for the
USP, and to 0.15 euro in the benchmark calibration) and for urban delivery
(0.07 euro cost compared to 0.11 euro for the USP, and to 0.15 euro in the
benchmark calibration). As for rural delivery, we maintain the assumption
that it would be extremely costly for the entrant to build a delivery network
there. Results for these costs calibrations (together with the original value
for the displacement ratio between bulk mail products of 0.75) are reported
in Table 4.
We first obtain that welfare increases in all cases when the entrant is more
efficient. If bypass is not available, the USP reacts to a more efficient entrant
by increasing its access charges and decreasing its bulk mail prices. The
total quantity sold by the entrant increases significantly, and the business of
selling access takes a lot more importance for the USP, because of both the
higher volumes and the higher margins made on this business. The welfare
cost of imposing minimum margin constraints or two baskets are quite small
(in terms of the welfare gain of moving from the optimal monopoly situation
to the optimal competitive situation) : this makes sense, since the opening to
competition increases a lot more total welfare when entrant’s costs are low.
The picture is very different once bypass is available: total welfare increases,
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but all the gains from having lower entrant’s costs are captured by consumers
of urban bulk mail, while other consumers lose surplus because of the very
large increase in the USP single-piece price. We study elsewhere (De Donder
et al.(2006b)) the situation where the USP single piece good is priced using
an equi-proportional mark-up formula: we obtain that the single-piece mail
price has to be very large (close to 0.8 euro) to allow the USP to break even.
At prices below this, such as those arising under entry through access only,
significant financial deficits emerge which would need to be funded to ensure
the continuing provision of universal service.
6 Introducing a universal service fund
Up to now, we have assumed that the USP’s fixed cost has to be financed by
the USP selling (single-piece and bulk ) mail products as well as access to the
entrant. One problem we have identified with this method is that the mark-
up over the marginal access cost may induce the entrant to (inefficiently)
bypass the USP delivery network, especially in the urban area. Another way
to finance (at least in part) the USP fixed cost is to impose a tax on the
entrant’s output4, whose proceeds would fund a universal service fund that
would reimburse the USP for (part of) its fixed cost. The main advantage
of this output tax is that, unlike a mark-up over the marginal access cost, it
does not induce the entrant to bypass the USP network, since the output tax
has to be paid by the entrant whatever its delivery method (see Armstrong
2006).
More precisely, we assume that a specific tax of τ euro is imposed on
the entrant’s output, whose proceeds go to the USP. The value of this
tax is set exogenously by the regulator. Formally, to the USP profit for-
mula (equation (14) in the appendix), we now add the tax proceeds –
i.e., τ
¡
yEU (p
I
U , p
E
U) + y
E
R(p
I
R, p
E
R)
¢
. We keep the assumption of a competi-
tive fringe behaviour of the entrant, so that the entrant breaks even with
pEi = c
E + τ +min(ai, dEi ), i = U,R. It is clear that the value of the tax does
not impact the bypass decision of the entrant.
We first look at the impact of imposing an exogenous tax τ in the cases
where bypass is not available to the entrant. In these cases, the tax τ and
the access charges aU and aR are perfectly substitutable: it is the sum of
τ and aU and of τ and aR that matters both to the entrant’s price and to
the USP profit, and any increase in the exogenous τ results in a decrease
of the same amount of both access charges. Intuitively, taxing output and
4Alternatively, we could assume that the USP also has to pay the output tax. This
would not change the results we obtain below.
14
posting a mark-up over the marginal access costs produce identical results
when the postal production technology is such that one unit of input (use of
USP delivery network) is always needed to produce one unit of output (bulk
mail).
Things get more interesting when bypass is allowed. Recall that, in our
benchmark simulations reported in Table 2, urban bypass occurs under the
global price cap mechanism because the optimal access charge in that case
(0.21 euro – second column in Table 2) is larger than the entrant’s delivery
cost (0.15 euro). This corresponds to the case where τ=0. Increasing τ from
0 results in a decrease by the same amount of both aU and aR. Because of the
substitutability between τ and the access charges, the optimum urban access
charge (when the USP does not take bypass possibilities into account) stays
larger than 0.15 euro as long as τ is smaller than 0.06 euro. On the other
hand, for τ larger than 0.06 euro, the optimal access charge becomes smaller
than the entrant’s delivery cost, and the entrant chooses access rather than
bypass.
Table 5 illustrates numerically these results for the global price cap mech-
anism when bypass is available to the entrant. The first column corresponds
to τ = 0 – i.e., the case with urban bypass reported in the last column of
Table 2. The next three columns correspond to positive values of τ (0.01
euro, 0.03 euro and 0.05 euro) smaller than 0.06 euro – i.e., to cases where
urban bypass occurs because 0.21 euro −τ > 0.15 euro. The last column
corresponds to the case where τ is exogenously set at a value larger than
0.06 euro – i.e., when the value of τ is large enough to allow the USP to
decrease its urban access charge below the entrant’s delivery cost.
We now look at the impact of increasing the exogenous tax τ on equi-
librium prices, volumes, contributions to USP profit and consumer surpluses
with the global price cap mechanism. Increasing τ allows the USP to post a
lower single-piece mail price, resulting in higher volumes and higher consumer
surpluses. Increasing τ generates an increase in the USP bulk mail price and
a decrease in the USP rural bulk mail price. The entrant’s prices move in the
same direction as the USP bulk mail prices. These price changes produce an
increase in the USP’s bulk mail volumes, a decrease in the entrant’s urban
bulk mail volumes, and have a non monotone impact on the USP rural bulk
mail volume. The impact of a larger τ on total postal volumes are also non
monotone, with first a decrease and then an increase.
The contribution to the USP profit of single-piece mail (both urban and
rural) decreases with τ . The share of urban bulk mail increases while that
of rural bulk mail decreases. Interestingly, the share of tax proceeds is non
monotone: it is first increasing, then decreasing in τ . Observe that this share
stays quite low, of the order of 1% of total fixed costs, as long as bypass
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occurs. Finally, the surplus of all consumers increases, except for the urban
bulk mail buyers. Total welfare increases with the tax, but stays below the
monopoly level (6.510 bn euros) as long as the tax is below that resulting in
bypass.
The main results we obtain with entrant’s output taxation are as follows.
If bypass does not occur, the output tax and the access charge levels are
perfect substitutes, and the equilibrium is not affected by the precise value
of the tax. If bypass occurs, the value of the tax has an impact on the
equilibrium: a higher tax leads to a lower single-piece mail price and higher
urban bulk mail prices, so that total welfare increases even though urban
bulk mail consumers’ surplus decreases.
7 Conclusion
In setting price controls, regulators in the postal sector may consider addi-
tional objectives to the goals of ensuring the continuing provision of universal
service and maximising allocative efficiency and, hence, introduce procedures
to meet these additional objectives. In this paper, we have explored aspects of
these issues by considering the impacts and effects of regulators in the postal
sector adopting price control procedures that seek to achieve objectives other
than the maximisation of allocative efficiency and economic welfare. Clearly
these procedures result in lower levels of welfare than those from the bench-
mark of GPC.
Our initial results from the numerical calibration of our model indicate
that in the case where entry is confined only to access, a range of proce-
dures appear capable of meeting objectives for universal service, equity and
competitive entry, prospectively, with quite small adverse impacts on eco-
nomic welfare. If these non-efficiency objectives are valued highly then it
appears that the welfare costs of meeting them may be worth incurring at
least at the calibration values initially adopted in our model. However, if
bypass is available these trade offs become more costly. Under GPC, welfare
is lower and the single piece price significantly higher than when only access
is available to potential entrants. By extension from the no bypass case, the
welfare costs and potential for non-achievement of at least some objectives
increase with the extent of entry through bypass. We consider also the effect
of introducing a universal service fund.
Our analysis has considered these price control procedures individually.
However, where a regulator is seeking to achieve a number of objectives
simultaneously this may lead to the combined application of some of these
procedures or their application with other similar rules and constraints. This
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is likely to lead to further divergence from the GPC benchmark. Under these
circumstances also there is an increase in the likelihood that one or more
objectives may not be met or only met by violating the breakeven constraint.
Such possibilities and trade-offs can be explored further through our model
by examining a range of parameter values and combinations of non-optimal
procedures.
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Table 2: Simulations results5
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
GPC GPC Min Margin 2 basket GPC
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.609 0.608 0.577 0.500 0.853
-USP bulk pIU 0.360 0.359 0.372 0.386 0.287
pIR 0.424 0.424 0.432 0.453 0.538
-access aU - 0.210 0.202 0.231 -
aR - 0.269 0.262 0.292 0.357
-entrant pEU - 0.360 0.352 0.381 0.300
pER - 0.419 0.412 0.442 0.507
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.531 1.531 1.551 1.600 1.374
xR 0.383 0.383 0.388 0.400 0.344
Total 1.913 1.914 1.939 2.000 1.718
-USP bulk yIU 6.599 5.909 5.319 5.753 6.221
yIR 1.623 1.526 1.411 1.486 1.370
Total 8.222 7.435 6.730 7.239 7.591
Total USP volumes 10.135 9.349 8.669 9.239 9.308
-Entrant’s bulk yEU - 0.922 1.601 0.898 1.142
yER - 0.130 0.266 0.126 0.116
Total - 1.052 1.867 1.024 1.258
Total market volumes 10.135 10.401 10.536 10.263 10.567
5Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 2 (continued): Simulations results6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
GPC GPC Min Margin 2 basket GPC
Contributions to Profit
-single-piece urban 0.488 0.487 0.445 0.336 0.774
rural 0.103 0.103 0.092 0.064 0.176
-USP’s bulk urban 0.856 0.765 0.754 0.897 0.354
rural 0.234 0.219 0.215 0.257 0.354
-Access urban - 0.092 0.147 0.108 -
rural - 0.014 0.027 0.017 0.023
Share of single-piece 0.351 0.351 0.319 0.238 0.565
Share of Access - 0.063 0.104 0.074 0.014
Net Consumer Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.830 1.831 1.879 2.000 1.475
rural 0.458 0.458 0.470 0.500 0.369
-bulk urban 3.317 3.330 3.271 3.156 3.832
rural 0.906 0.907 0.896 0.860 0.731
Sum 6.510 6.526 6.515 6.516 6.407
6Profit and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Table 3: Simulations results7with σ = 0.6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
GPC GPC Min Margin 2 basket GPC
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.609 0.606 0.599 0.500 0.839
-USP bulk pIU 0.360 0.359 0.362 0.385 0.296
pIR 0.424 0.423 0.420 0.452 0.532
-access aU - 0.193 0.192 0.209 -
aR - 0.249 0.247 0.267 0.317
-entrant pEU - 0.343 0.342 0.359 0.300
pER - 0.399 0.397 0.417 0.467
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.531 1.532 1.537 1.600 1.383
xR 0.383 0.383 0.384 0.400 0.346
Total 1.913 1.915 1.921 2.000 1.729
-USP bulk yIU 6.599 5.478 5.385 5.337 5.766
yIR 1.623 1.449 1.453 1.412 1.308
Total 8.222 6.927 6.838 6.749 7.074
Total USP volumes 10.135 8.842 8.759 8.749 8.803
-Entrant’s bulk yEU - 1.879 1.994 1.831 2.090
yER - 0.293 0.294 0.286 0.265
Total - 2.172 2.288 2.117 2.355
Total market volumes 10.135 11.015 11.047 10.865 11.158
7Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
20
Table 3 (continued): Simulations results8with σ = 0.6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
GPC GPC Min Margin 2 basket GPC
Contributions to Profit
-single-piece urban 0.488 0.484 0.475 0.336 0.759
rural 0.103 0.102 0.100 0.064 0.173
-USP’s bulk urban 0.856 0.705 0.713 0.825 0.378
rural 0.234 0.207 0.203 0.242 0.329
-Access urban - 0.156 0.164 0.182 -
rural - 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.041
Share of single-piece 0.351 0.349 0.342 0.238 0.555
Share of Access - 0.108 0.113 0.127 0.025
Net Consumer Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.830 1.834 1.845 2.000 1.494
rural 0.458 0.458 0.461 0.500 0.374
-bulk urban 3.317 3.365 3.346 3.194 3.805
rural 0.906 0.911 0.917 0.865 0.743
Sum 6.510 6.569 6.568 6.559 6.416
8Profit and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Table 4: Simulations results9with cE = 0.09, dEU = 0.07
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
GPC GPC Min Margin 2 basket GPC
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.609 0.601 0.574 0.500 1.005
-USP bulk pIU 0.360 0.357 0.377 0.381 0.265
pIR 0.424 0.421 0.439 0.447 0.609
-access aU - 0.215 0.207 0.235 -
aR - 0.274 0.269 0.295 0.426
-entrant pEU - 0.305 0.297 0.325 0.160
pER - 0.364 0.359 0.385 0.516
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.531 1.535 1.553 1.600 1.277
xR 0.383 0.384 0.388 0.400 0.319
Total 1.913 1.919 1.941 2.000 1.596
-USP bulk yIU 6.599 4.387 3.591 4.282 2.796
yIR 1.623 1.129 0.962 1.102 0.939
Total 8.222 5.516 4.553 5.384 3.734
Total USP volumes 10.135 7.435 6.494 7.384 5.330
-Entrant’s bulk yEU - 2.976 3.857 2.905 5.900
yER - 0.666 0.854 0.650 0.554
Total - 3.642 4.711 3.555 6.453
Total market volumes 10.135 11.076 11.205 10.939 11.783
9Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 4 (continued): Simulations results10with σ = 0.6
Monopoly Competition
No Bypass Bypass
GPC GPC Min Margin 2 basket GPC
Contributions to Profit
-single-piece urban 0.488 0.478 0.440 0.336 0.913
rural 0.103 0.100 0.091 0.064 0.212
-USP’s bulk urban 0.856 0.556 0.529 0.646 0.098
rural 0.234 0.159 0.153 0.184 0.309
-Access urban - 0.312 0.375 0.362 -
rural - 0.076 0.093 0.088 0.148
Share of single-piece 0.351 0.344 0.316 0.238 0.670
Share of Access - 0.231 0.278 0.268 0.088
Net Consumer Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.830 1.841 1.884 2.000 1.273
rural 0.458 0.460 0.471 0.500 0.318
-bulk urban 3.317 3.452 3.396 3.289 4.423
rural 0.906 0.933 0.919 0.889 0.645
Sum 6.510 6.687 6.669 6.678 6.660
10Profit and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Table 5: Simulations results11with universal service fund
Competition - GPC
Bypass No Bypass
τ : 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 > 0.06
Prices:
-single-piece q 0.853 0.821 0.762 0.710 0.608
-USP bulk pIU 0.287 0.294 0.308 0.323 0.359
pIR 0.538 0.523 0.496 0.471 0.424
-access aU - - - - 0.210
aR 0.357 0.335 0.294 0.256 0.269
-entrant pEU 0.300 0.310 0.330 0.350 0.360
pER 0.507 0.485 0.474 0.456 0.419
Quantities:
-single-piece xU 1.374 1.395 1.432 1.466 1.531
xR 0.344 0.349 0.358 0.366 0.383
Total 1.718 1.743 1.790 1.832 1.914
-USP bulk yIU 6.221 6.314 6.485 6.637 5.909
yIR 1.370 1.315 1.428 1.462 1.526
Total 7.591 7.629 7.913 8.098 7.435
Total USP volumes 9.308 9.373 9.703 9.931 9.349
-Entrant’s bulk yEU 1.142 0.957 0.603 0.269 0.922
yER 0.116 0.219 0.121 0.124 0.130
Total 1.258 1.176 0.725 0.393 1.052
Total market volumes 10.567 10.548 10.428 10.324 10.401
11Prices are in euros and volumes in billion items.
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Table 5 (continued): Simulations results12with US fund
Competition - GPC
Bypass No Bypass
τ : 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 >0.06
Contributions to Profit
-single-piece urban 0.774 0.740 0.676 0.615 0.487
rural 0.176 0.168 0.151 0.135 0.103
-USP’s bulk urban 0.354 0.402 0.507 0.619 0.765
rural 0.354 0.320 0.308 0.279 0.219
-Access urban - - - - access+tax=0.092
rural 0.023 0.038 0.016 0.012 access+tax=0.014
-Tax urban - 0.010 0.018 0.013
rural - 0.002 0.004 0.006
Share of single-piece 0.565 0.541 0.492 0.447 0.351
Share of Access 0.014 0.023 0.010 0.007 access+tax=0.063
Share of Tax 0 0.007 0.013 0.012
Net Consumer Surpluses
-single-piece urban 1.475 1.520 1.603 1.679 1.831
rural 0.369 0.380 0.401 0.420 0.458
-bulk urban 3.832 3.778 3.671 3.563 3.330
rural 0.731 0.754 0.794 0.832 0.907
Sum 6.407 6.432 6.468 6.493 6.526
12Profit and surpluses are in billion euros.
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Appendix
We show how to decentralize the Ramsey second-best optimal prices with
a minimum margin constraint (section 3.1.) using a global price cap. With
a global price cap, the USP maximizes its profit subject to the constraint
that an average of its prices cannot exceed a certain level, which we call the
price cap. The regulator sets both the price cap and the weights to be used
by the USP when calculating its average price. The USP then optimizes by
choosing its prices level.
Assume for the moment that the regulator has chosen the following weights:
nx for single-piece price, nIi for bulk mail in area i and nai for access charge
to area i, as well as the average price of p¯. The optimization program of the
USP is then
max
q,pIU ,p
I
R,aU ,aR
(q − cx − dxU)xU + (q − cx − dxR)xR (14)
+(pIU − cI − dIU)yIU + (pIR − cI − dIR)yIR
+(aU − dIU)yEU + (aR − dIR)yER − F
−μ
£
nxq + n
I
Up
I
U + n
I
Rp
I
R + naUaU + naRaR − p¯
¤
where μ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the price cap constraint and
where the arguments of the demand functions have been omitted. We add to
this classical GPC the margin constraints (2) and denote by ζi the Lagrange
multiplier for the margin constraint in area i. The first order condition for q
is given by
xU + xR + (q − cx − dxU)
∂xU
∂q
+ (q − c− dxR)
∂xR
∂q
− μnx = 0, (15)
while the first-order conditions for bulk mail prices and access charges are
given by
yIi + (p
I
i − cI − dIi )
∂yIi
∂pIi
+ (ai − dIi )
∂yEi
∂pIi
− μnIi + ζi = 0, (16)
yEi + (p
I
i − cI − dIi )
∂yIi
∂pEi
+ (ai − dIi )
∂yEi
∂pEi
− μnai − ζi = 0. (17)
We denote the prices solving the modified Ramsey problem (equations
(3), (4) and (5)) with a star: q∗, pI∗i and a
∗
i , i = U,R. The decentralization
of these prices requires that there exist values μ∗ and ζ∗i of the Lagrange
multipliers such that (q∗, pI∗i , a
∗
i , μ∗, η∗i ) solve (15),(16) and (17). For this,
the values of the weights and of the price cap must be chosen carefully by
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the regulator. Comparing the first order conditions of the modified Ramsey
problem and of the GPC with margin constraints, one can show that the
weights should be set equal to the corresponding third-best quantities,
n∗x = xU(q
∗) + xR(q
∗),
nI∗i = y
I
i (p
I∗
i , c
E + a∗i ),
n∗ai = y
E
i (p
I∗
i , c
E + a∗i ),
and the average price to the corresponding average
p¯∗ = n∗xq
∗ + nI∗U p
I∗
U + n
I∗
R p
I∗
R + n
∗
aUa
∗
U + n
∗
aRa
∗
R.
One can verify that the Lagrange multipliers of the price-cap constraint and
of the minimum margin constraints are given by
μ∗ =
1
1 + λ∗
,
ζ∗i =
η∗i
1 + λ∗
,
where λ∗ (resp. η∗i ) is the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the
budget constraint (resp., of the minimum margin constraint in area i) in the
modified Ramsey problem.
In words, the decentralisation properties of the GPC still hold when an
(arbitrary) constraint is imposed on the Ramsey problem. This general-
izes the decentralization results developed for a generic network industry
in Laffont and Tirole (1996) and applied to the postal sector by Crew and
Kleindorfer (1995) and Billette et al. (2003).
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